The film is divided into three parts. The first part alleges that there have been numerous savior figures with the same essential life story as Jesus (crucified, buried for three days, then resurrected; having twelve disciples, etc.), and that Christianity is simply one more version of an archetypal “solar myth” that has emerged in many places throughout history. In offering this thesis, Zeitgeist appeals to a pantheon of deities from a wide range of cultures, such as the Persian deity Mithra and the Egyptian divinity Horus. The film goes on to argue that Jesus himself never existed as a person and that references to Jesus in secular literature from his era (such as the Jewish historian Josephus and the Roman historian Tacitus) are either forgeries or are of no use in establishing the existence of a historical Jesus. The second portion of the film argues that the World Trade Center tragedy was an engineered disturbance created by the Bush Administration, and the third section of the film claims that the Federal Reserve is used by international bankers to control world events.

It is difficult to gauge how many people have seen Zeitgeist, but statistics offered on video-library websites such as YouTube have logged hundreds of thousands of views for Zeitgeist material, and the producer of the film, Peter Joseph, sponsored a “Zeitgeist Day” on March 15, 2008, and again on March 15, 2009, during which the film was screened at hundreds of venues worldwide. The Zeitgeist website claims that the film has been viewed more than one hundred million times.¹

Christian apologetics ministries have received numerous requests concerning the information contained in part one of Zeitgeist, and thankfully, there is plenty of material available to answer it.² However, Zeitgeist presents us with some strenuous challenges in answering its claims, because it engages in a tactic that I have termed hurling the elephant. Hurling the elephant occurs when a claimant attempts to overwhelm their ideological opponent with an enormous number of truth claims, each of which would require significant research to answer. Zeitgeist’s rapid-fire assertions about various pagan deities, and about Christianity being a reconstructed solar myth, would take literally weeks or months to adequately untangle if we did not have answers immediately at hand.

It is a simple matter for Zeitgeist to say, for example, “The pagan deity Mithra was crucified, buried, and rose from the dead after three days.” We may perhaps be tempted to answer just as simply, with a bare denial, but few would consider this to be a sufficient response. Therefore, we would be practically compelled to seek out sources on Mithraism— most of them rather obscure, or available only through academic libraries—in order to show that indeed Mithra was not crucified and did not rise from the dead. Because of the obscurity of the topics at hand, most viewers will be unable easily to confirm or deny the claims made in Zeitgeist.

Zeitgeist is particularly unrevealing in terms of the sources for its claims, which stand firmly against the consensus of modern scholarship, including scholarship that is not associated with Christian scholars or institutions. Indeed, when the film does name any sources, we do not find scholars used, but rather, uncredentialed commentators such as the deceased comedian George Carlin, the American revolutionary Thomas Paine, and the conspiracy theorist Jordan Maxwell.

To determine what sources the film uses, the viewer must consult the Zeitgeist website, where we find that Joseph acknowledges the film’s indebtedness to works such as The Christ Conspiracy, authored by Dorothy Murdock (under the pen name of “Acharya S”).³ The character of the sources used by Zeitgeist is manifest even upon a cursory examination: Murdock’s book, for example, was produced by Adventures Unlimited Press—a publishing house that also prints books that suggest that NASA faked the moon landings and that Egypt’s Great Pyramid was part of an ancient “weapon of mass destruction.”

The chief premise of part one of Zeitgeist, that Jesus did not exist, is popularly referred to as the “Christ myth” thesis. The Christ myth is manifested in two forms of argument, which are not necessarily used exclusively of one another. One form of the Christ myth argues that the relative “silence” of the New Testament epistles concerning the life of Jesus indicates that the authors of those epistles did not consider Jesus to be a human who recently walked the earth. The other form of the Christ myth, the one primarily engaged by Zeitgeist, argues that the human figure of Jesus was a figment of the church’s imagination, created from a pastiche of pagan mythologies, and later historicized in the Gospels, which are supposed to have all been written as late as two hundred years after the time of Jesus.

The “Christ myth” is a view not held by any responsible, credentialed historian. For this reason, if Joseph is earnest about validating Zeitgeist’s claims, the film ought to be able to produce source material of two types: (1) it should offer views by credentialed scholars who stand against the consensus of the majority of scholars and maintain, for instance, that Mithra was crucified and had twelve disciples. (2) It should offer citations from primary sources such as ancient texts that indicate that Mithra was crucified and had twelve disciples.

Zeitgeist is glaringly deficient on both counts. To continue with the given example of Mithra, there are a number of scholars who are recognized as authorities on the topic of Mithraism.⁴ However, we do not find that Zeitgeist shows any awareness of these scholars or their works. This, however, is quite understandable, since these scholars, in turn, show no awareness of Mithra’s reputed crucifixion or resurrection, nor of his possession of disciples. Rather, they are unanimous in their agreement that Mithra himself never died, and that his greatest act was the slaying of a cosmic bull (a representation of the constellation Taurus). Naturally, if Mithra never died, he also was neither buried nor resurrected. There is also no record of Mithra having twelve disciples, although other adherents to the Christ-myth thesis promulgated by Zeitgeist have erroneously appealed to a post-Christian carving of Mithra surrounded by figures representing the twelve signs of the Zodiac. They misinterpreted these zodiacal figures as “disciples.”

We might hope that this sort of refutation would settle the issue of Zeitgeist’s reliability, but therein lies one of the great challenges presented by the film. It is not so much that Zeitgeist’s claims of fact are difficult to refute—once we have the right sources in hand—but that it is difficult to convince a Zeitgeist-believer that a refutation has actually taken place.

Zeitgeist assures the viewer that we have been “lied to” by the powers that be. Therefore, the viewer has been given a response that answers all refutations automatically: Any dissenting source—even a neutral, non-Christian scholar such as Mithraic scholar David Ulansey—must be in on the “conspiracy,” and academia must be one of the institutions that have “lied to us.” Zeitgeist provides the “true believer” with a ready rationale for dismissing all contrary data and for regarding any person purporting to refute the film’s claim as deluded by, or part of, the same cover-up. While it may not be impossible to instill some reasonable doubts about the film by asking why serious, credentialed scholars who are specialists in ancient religions do not reflect Zeitgeist’s conclusions in their own works, it may nevertheless be extremely difficult to do so.

In terms of primary (ancient) sources, a rather telling confession was offered by Joseph on the Zeitgeist website in answer to general requests for such information: “Well, even though we do not have many of the original texts from the Egyptian religion, many other religions have no available primary sources, and the information comes down through analysis of traditions that each religion practiced, as recorded by historians. The idea that the ’original’ must be available in order to prove truth is absurd and a double standard.”⁵

In this, Joseph has clearly confused a request for documentation from original writings (e.g., verification from the text of a work of a Roman author such as Plutarch, as may be found in any public library) with a request for “hard copies” of original ancient texts (e.g., an actual text handwritten by Plutarch himself). Nevertheless, using again the example of Mithra, if there were some ancient text or picture of Mithra being crucified, or resurrected, or surrounded by twelve disciples, then it should not be difficult for Joseph to produce a copy of this text or picture, and thus lend support to the film’s claims. Yet he does not. However, should he do so, he would be well advised to share that text or picture with leading Mithraic scholars, who are apparently unaware that such documentation exists!

Although parts two and three of the film do not concern Christianity, it is worth pointing out that the claims made in those portions are just as easily answered. There are a number of resources available debunking both WTC and Federal Reserve conspiracy theories, and we may find these refutations useful as “neutral ground” for questioning the reliability of the film in general.⁶ In a manner reminiscent of how critics of part one have responded to the film, critics of parts two and three note that Zeitgeist frequently quotes source material out of context and relies heavily on persons who are conspiracy theorists, and who are not credentialed experts in relevant fields such as engineering. It is also noteworthy that rather negative critiques of part one of the film have been offered by ardent non-Christians who have otherwise been highly critical of Christianity.⁷

There are many serious problems with Zeitgeist, but the greatest difficulty for those in the practice of apologetics is not in confronting the film’s claims. Rather, it is that the film’s creators have encouraged viewers to engage a siege mentality that blocks off any consideration of contrary claims. The battleground in which we confront this “spirit of the age” is not so much the realm of fact as it is the realm of psychology.

—James Patrick Holding

James Patrick Holding is president of Tekton Apologetics Ministries and author of Blowing the Doors Off! A Defense Manual for Christian Youth (Xulon Press, 2008).

notes

1 http://www.zeitgeistmovie.com/q&a.htm.

2 My book Shattering the Christ Myth (Longwood, FL: Xulon Press, 2008) offers a detailed rebuttal of Zeitgeist written by Jonathan Brown. Another useful resource is Joel McDurmon’s Zeitgeist the Movie Exposed (Powder Springs, GA: American Vision, 2008).

3 http://www.zeitgeistmovie.com/sources.htm. Murdock has also published an e-book “companion guide” to part one of Zeitgeist purporting to supplement and verify the film’s claims. Acharya S, The Companion Guide to Zeitgeist Part 1 (Seattle: Stellar House Publishing, 2007).

4 See for example David Ulansey, The Origins of the Mithraic Mysteries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Roger Beck, Planetary Gods and Planetary Orders in the Mysteries of Mithras (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1988).

5 This statement was found at http://www.zeitgeistmovie.com/q&a.htm on April 4, 2008. It has since been removed, but has been preserved by numerous witnesses such as http://www.listal.com/video/3916104.

6 For example, for part two, see Debunking 9/11 Myths by the editors of Popular Science, available online at http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/1227842.html and later expanded into a book by the same title (New York: Hearst, 2006). For part three, see Don’t Mind the Men behind the Curtain at http://www.conspiracyscience.com/articles/zeitgeist/part-three/.

7 Tim Callahan, editor of Skeptic magazine, offers one such critique from an atheist’s perspective, titled “The Greatest Story Ever Garbled,” at http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/09-0225.html#feature.

Baxter’s inflated assessment of his own abilities offers a fictional example of a real-life behavioral condition called the Dunning Effect. In 1999, David Dunning, a professor of psychology at Cornell University, and Justin Kruger, a graduate student, completed a study for the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology that led to a disturbing conclusion: like the fictional Ted Baxter, most incompetent people are unaware of their own incompetence, often blissfully, and possess an unwarranted assurance in their own capabilities and knowledge.

Dunning and Kruger focused their study specifically on their subjects’ competence in logic, grammar, and humor, but it does not take a great deal of experience in Christian apologetics and evangelism to discover that the Dunning Effect is prevalent in religion and spirituality as well. As apologists, we often will find ourselves in conversation with people who suffer from the Dunning Effect, and if we are not prepared for these encounters, they can become frustrating or difficult experiences.

Dunning Effects. It is quite normal for someone to assert an incorrect position confidently on a given topic. A person who does this merely occasionally is not necessarily afflicted with the Dunning Effect. The Dunning Effect only becomes apparent when someone makes incorrect assertions repeatedly, and substantive corrections do not erode his or her confidence. The Dunning Effect also may be detected by a question such as, “Do you consider yourself to be knowledgeable about this subject?” A person who confidently answers this question in the affirmative, yet repeatedly makes considerable errors regarding the subject matter may be a victim of the Dunning Effect.

Here is an example based on a real-life encounter of mine. Let us suppose that our conversation partners declare without hesitation that the Roman Emperor Constantine (AD 272–337) was at the head of a massive conspiracy to make Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire, using his military power to persuade others to his views. Ideas like this can be found in a number of popular sources that are antithetical to Christian belief, such as Dan Brown’s book, The Da Vinci Code. Let us assume that you investigate this matter and find that it is false. You research credible sources such as Philip Schaff’s History of the Christian Church or Rodney Stark’s The Rise of Christianity, and find no evidence for the claim that Constantine manipulated church history.

You return to inform your conversation partners of your findings. They assure you, however, that they have done a great deal of research and will not retract their conclusion. Frustrated, you inquire as to their sources for their claim, and find out that they include works such as Brown’s The Da Vinci Code!

In cases like this, your conversation partners may have unwarranted confidence in their abilities. First, they unjustifiably may believe themselves competent to evaluate critically sources and to determine their credibility. Hence, they have arrived at the conclusion that something like The Da Vinci Code is a reliable source for historical information. Second, they may believe that their knowledge of subjects such as history is sufficient for them to choose the claims of someone like Dan Brown over the claims of someone like Schaff or Stark who is recognized as a credible source of information in the field of Christian history. Indeed, such may be their confidence that they may ask you, for example, if Stark has ever read The Da Vinci Code and considered its claims!

Dunning and Discernment. Dunning’s discovery, of course, was not new, but was merely a verification of something that has been known for a very long time. Solomon could have warned about the Dunning Effect with no more clear words than those found in Proverbs 12:15: “The way of a fool seems right to him, but a wise man listens to advice” (NIV). The Dunning Effect is nothing more than a notable lack of the biblical virtue of discernment, and a refusal to heed the counsel of those who know better.

The Dunning Effect is now widespread. Two social factors have aided this spread, together producing conditions in which the Dunning Effect can flourish.

The first is the current atmosphere of postmodern society. Postmodernism has declared that there is no objective truth, and a natural corollary of this view is that any person’s understanding is as competent as any other person’s; therefore, there is no need for anyone to educate him- or herself and become competent in the facts of topics like church history. By default, everyone is already competent simply by virtue of having an opinion. Postmodern society therefore considers it sufficient to select any source one wishes for information (such as The Da Vinci Code), and anyone can have a view of history that is as good as anyone else’s, even as good as a professional historian’s.

A second factor that has enabled the spread of the Dunning Effect is the desire for ease, convenience, and quick answers. Many people with informational needs will seek out sources they can consult with a minimum of effort. These sources unfortunately tend to be far too “democratic” and (corresponding with the first factor of postmodernism) allow any person to voice his or her view as to what is “true.” The popular Internet resource Wikipedia is an example of this hypertrophic or excessively developing democracy in action. Wikipedia often is used as a source, not because it is reliable, but because it is easy to use, and because its entries usually come up first in Internet search engines.

Dunning Defenses. Victims of the Dunning Effect hold beliefs that are not dependent on rational argument; because of this, they may resort to using a series of defense mechanisms as a substitute for argument. These mechanisms seem sound to people who are under the influence of the Dunning Effect, precisely because they are unaware of the actual lack of effectiveness of those mechanisms in defending their positions. It is important to know how to refute these defenses effectively—if not for the sake of your conversation partners, then for the sake of any who may be witnessing your efforts at dialogue.

“That source you used is biased or has an agenda.” An appeal to a source’s “bias” is often taken as a slam-dunk refutation that automatically renders anything found in that source to be suspect, unreliable, or untrue. Truth, however, is by nature biased—toward the truth. “Bias” or “agenda” does not affect the content of an argument, nor does it relieve a doubter of the burden to make his or her own case against or in response to that argument.

“It’s arrogant to act like you’re right.” Con­duct­ing an immediate psychoanalysis of someone who is presenting an argument does not counter the content of that argument. Like the claim of bias, it is a diversion from the issue.

“You’re not giving both sides of the argument.” This response assumes that we are required to present not only our arguments, but those of our opposition. People who know of opposing arguments generally do not use this defense mechanism. It places an unfair burden on us by insisting that, although we often do address opposing arguments in our rebuttals, we must seek out and present those views for our conversation partners to consider.

“You can’t prove it didn’t happen.” A myth of postmodernism is that any simple assertion, like the one that constitutes this defense mechanism, grants a thesis automatic validity. Critics of Christianity may have no proof, for example, that Constantine manipulated church history, but because they merely can conceive of the possibility that he did, it becomes our responsibility to provide a refutation. (The irony is that the same people who present this defense also may dismiss our opposing statements as “just [our] opinion” and therefore not in need of any detailed refutation.)

What can apologists or evangelists do when confronted with victims of the Dunning Effect? We initially may try to lead them gently into a realization of their need for more or better knowledge. A Socratic method of asking questions may be helpful in leading Dunning victims into an intellectual quandary in which they realize that they do not know the facts as well as they think they do. Naturally, we ourselves must be sufficiently expert in a given topic in order to use it as the basis for our questions.

If our conversation partners begin to acknowledge that they cannot answer our questions, then we have taken the first steps toward circumventing the Dunning Effect. If, however, they clearly are unable to admit to their lack of knowledge—if, for example, they attempt to invent answers to questions in order to avoid confessing ignorance—then we have a signal that we should consider seeking more fertile ground for evangelism. Jesus did not counsel His disciples to persist in evangelism in a town that rejected their message, but told them to shake the dust from their feet as a testimony against that town (Luke 9:3–5). We judiciously must weigh our evangelism encounters and decide whether our time and abilities are of better use.

—James Patrick Holding

James Patrick Holding is President of Tekton Apologetics Ministries and the author of The Impossible Faith (Xulon Press, 2007).

Recent literature advocating atheism has not been noted for cordiality. Works by Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Richard Dawkins offer pugnacious, if not particularly well-informed, critiques of religious belief. Even their titles (such as Hitchens’s god Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, and Dawkins’s The God Delusion) bespeak an attitude that sees religion in a wholly negative light. Readers interested in a less combative treatise on behalf of atheism will, therefore, welcome French philosopher Andre Comte-Sponville’s The Little Book of Atheist Spirituality.

Reminiscent of other “little” volumes like William Bennett’s Book of Virtues, Comte-Sponville’s book is intended to summarize what the author perceives to be the advantages of atheism, in a cordial and nonthreatening manner. Comte-Sponville’s tone is conversa­tion­al and even-handed, and he indicates that he sees “no reason to take faith away” (p. 10) from anyone if they are content with their religious beliefs or “live better” (11) because of them. He regards most religions as “worthy of respect” (11) and rejects what he calls “nihilistic barbarism,” (25) which calls for the demolition of all values. He also regards his atheism as an “opinion” he holds (70) rather than a conviction.

Comte-Sponville’s publication record is reminiscent of Bennett’s in other ways. He has authored other “little” books, including A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues and The Little Book of Philosophy. Additional titles that have appeared so far only in French include a dictionary of philosophy and a book on the morality of capitalism.

The God Arguments

Readers who expect a deep, philosophical defense of atheism in The Little Book of Atheist Spirituality will come away disappointed. Comte-Sponville spends some time on argumentation, but the bulk of his book could best be described as a “personal testimony” describing his satisfaction with atheism. It admittedly would be unfair to expect a deep defense of atheism in such a small volume, but what little Comte-Sponville does offer in terms of rational defense is not persuasive. By his own admission, he “prefer[s] not to spend a great deal of time” on theistic proofs (77) and, not surprisingly, he fails to give them their due.

For example, Comte-Sponville briefly addresses the “cosmological argument” for the existence of God, which appeals to God as a necessary “first cause” for the existence of the universe. Although he acknowledges that this proof gives him pause (82), he rejects it with a wave of the hand. “But how do we know there is an order? How do we know reason is right? What makes us think there is no such thing as the absolutely inexplicable? Why should contingency not have the last word—or the final silence? Because it would be absurd? So what? Why shouldn’t the truth be absurd?” Arguably, “So what?” could just as well represent the entirety of Comte-Sponville’s response to the cosmological argument! He does not answer the cosmological argument, but retreats to a refuge of unjustified uncertainty. He further argues that even if the cosmological argument were valid, we could not be certain of the identity and nature of the Creator. But this misses the point that regardless of the Creator’s identity, the atheist position still would be in error.

Comte-Sponville also addresses the argument that design in the universe is proof of a Creator, noting the common expression of this argument that a clock, with all of its springs and gears, would never be taken to be a product of chance. Comte-Sponville’s responses are singularly unenlightening. First, he says, “it is only an analogy: the universe is clearly not made up of springs and gears” (88). This of course is true, but many critical elements of life and the universe, such as organic cells, are far more complex than “springs and gears”! Comte-Sponville takes the analogy far too literally.

Second, Comte-Sponville points to what he calls “examples of disorder”—things like tumors or natural disasters. These, however, do not prove “disorder”—they indicate, rather, an ordered system within which something has gone awry (e.g., a tumor); or else they are natural processes to which humans fall victim because of their own error (e.g., building a city in the shadow of a known volcano). Comte-Sponville’s retort is like claiming that a gun was not designed by an intelligent being, because it is sometimes used to kill innocent people! Not surprisingly, Comte-Sponville appeals to evolution as a sufficient explanation for the appearance of design (89); however, he errs in stating that the design proof has “suffered greatly from scientific progress” (90). The reverse is true: as science has progressed since Darwin, it has encountered even greater complexity, which has rendered evolutionary explanations even more implausible.

Special Appearances

Comte-Sponville declares that he would be convinced of theism if “[God] would just appear to us” (94). He notes that he has heard believers argue that God conceals Himself; such a God he sees as “childish” and “dissembling” (95). One proper response to this is, as Comte-Sponville notes, that God does not wish to impugn our freedom to choose (96), but there is more to the argument than that. The full answer is that God has not hidden Himself. His existence is plain to see (Rom. 1). The premise that God “conceals Himself” simply means that God does not perform tricks for those who refuse to accept evidence that is sufficient as it is. It is rather one who demands more proof than is needed who is being “childish,” inasmuch as the person supposes him- or herself to be deserving of special attention from God.

More broadly, humanity lives in a way that is contrary in spirit to this demand: some argue that God ought to reveal Himself specially to us, but the act of sin—shaking a fist in God’s face and denying His moral law (reflecting one’s true desire)—amounts to a demand that God not reveal Himself, but instead leave us alone. Only the morally perfect could justly ask God for a unique personal revelation. Comte-Sponville, however, seems inclined to shift the burden to God no matter the circumstances. For example, noting the profusion of violence and vulgarity on television, he writes: “It might be objected that God is not responsible for our TV programs, and this is true. But he is credited with having made humanity, and humanity is responsible for TV ratings and programs” (121–22). It is difficult not to suspect a “childish” spirit in commentary like this. One may as well blame Henry Ford for all accidents involving Ford vehicles.

Comte-Sponville says little else in terms of evidential arguments. He does not address such issues as biblical reliability or the resurrection of Jesus; instead, he is content simply to note the existence of competing claims of revelation and remark on the purported difficulty of deciding which one is valid (72). To that extent, Comte-Sponville’s challenge to Christians is not a difficult one.

Make Mine Experience

Without God, what is the nature of the “spirituality” Comte-Sponville offers? It is a sort of mystical experience, one that requires the “dissolving of the ego” (150) and offers a sense of connection with the natural world. Comte-Sponville describes one of his own mystical experiences (155–60) in which a walk in the woods left him with a sense of “seemingly infinite happiness” and peace. His description resembles Buddhist beliefs in which the means to personal peace is to deny self and extinguish desire: he speaks of having felt “consciousness without ego, happiness without narcissism,” and of an “excess of love, passion, anxiety [and] worry” that separates us “from the absolute.” Indeed, Comte-Sponville frequently describes his experience in life in Eastern terms, such as advaita, or “nonduality,” and “be[ing] at one with the world” (168).

Christian readers might find especially poignant Comte-Sponville’s “personal testimony,” in which he declares that he has found immense satisfaction in atheism. After abandoning the Christianity of his youth, Comte-Sponville writes, “it felt like a liberation…It was as if I had left childhood behind me, with its fantasies and fears…and entered the real world at long last—the adult world, the world of action, the world of truth, unhampered by forgiveness or Providence…I’m an atheist, and happy to be one” (5–6). There is an object lesson here for our evangelism: although there is nothing inherently wrong in using personal testimony as an evangelistic tool, the fact that someone like Comte-Sponville can produce a “personal testimony” on behalf of his atheism warns us that we also should incorporate an objective, factual aspect into our witnessing. The basis for Christian faith is the objective fact that Christ is risen (1 Cor. 15:14), not subjective feelings of freedom or joy.

Nothing Matters

Comte-Sponville’s professions of happiness with his atheism, however, raise suspicions when compared with other comments he makes. All too often, it seems that his answer to certain questions and problems is that we should not answer the question and ignore the problem. We are to convince ourselves, or simply accept, that the status quo in the atheist world is satisfactory. Thus, for example, Comte-Sponville addresses the matter of death within a materialist paradigm: death in such a scenario would amount to an end of conscious existence, a prospect many people find frightening. Comte-Sponville responds, “What frightens us is our own imagination. What reassures us is our reason. By definition, there can be nothing to fear in nothingness.” Atheists, he tells us, “accept our mortality as best we can and try to get used to the idea of nothingness. Can this actually be done? We try not to obsess about it. Death will take everything away with it, including the fear it instills in us. Life on earth is more important to us, and quite sufficient” (8–9).

It is difficult to see how this is anything other than a commendation to pretend that there is no reason for despair concerning death. To say that “there can be nothing to fear in nothingness” is to miss the point: what people fear in such a context is not nothingness in itself, but the loss of conscious existence. This is not to say that Comte-Sponville’s answer, in one sense, is inappropriate: in a universe where there is no assurance of life after death, putting the best face on the matter may be a viable alternative for preserving one’s happiness, if not one’s sanity. As Comte-Sponville puts it, “You only live once. Is that any reason to spoil the single life you have?” (54). The Bible expresses the same sentiment, in the same context of despair: “If the dead are not raised, ‘Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die’” (1 Cor. 15:32 NIV). But this also would be, for the professing atheist, a morbid hypocrisy. Comte-Sponville’s solution amounts to keeping ourselves busy with experiences so that we can avoid facing the inevitable—as well as avoid thinking about our own inconsistencies.

To this extent, Comte-Sponville reminds the reader less of William Bennett and more of self-help guru Wayne Dyer. Comte-Sponville lacks Dyer’s presuppositions concerning the ability of thought to control reality, but his mystical identification of human beings with the world, and his means of resolving the despair of nihilism simply by acting as though there were nothing to be nihilistic about, is highly reminiscent of Dyer’s commendations to send away problems by rewriting one’s agreement with reality.

Moral Matters

Comte-Sponville’s solution for humanity, against the threat of nihilistic barbarism, is faith—in the sense of fidelity to some binding source. He admits that religion does serve this purpose, but replies that there is no proof that “the only conceivable social bond is the belief in God” (13). The question, however, is not whether belief in God serves as the only conceivable social bond, but whether it is the only adequate social bond that will be able to serve all of humanity’s needs and to persist under criticism. A society based on atheism as a bonding mechanism has been tried—and has been shown to be a failure. Comte-Sponville disagrees; he admits the examples of Soviet Russia, Albania, and China, but claims that the results were “inconclusive” and that they “did not last long enough to make up a true civilization” (12). What perhaps should occur to Comte-Sponville here is that societies like Soviet Russia did not last precisely because of the inherent weaknesses of its ideological infrastructure.

Comte-Sponville is certainly correct to say that even atheists can uphold important values without belief in God. As many theistic philosophers have pointed out, however, in such cases the atheist is required to borrow their “moral capital” from the theistic system. Comte-Sponville even plainly acknowledges that this is what he is doing when he says, “Renouncing a God who has met his social demise….does not compel us to renounce the moral, cultural, and spiritual values that have been formulated in his name” (21). The real question is not whether atheists can uphold moral values, but whether they can do so for a sustained period in a way that satisfies consistency of worldview, and in turn provides a sound basis for continuing to preserve those values. Theists argue that God alone provides the basis required. Comte-Sponville is aware of this, but he insists that it is enough that “everything tends to prove that we need [values] in order to subsist in a way we find humanly acceptable” (22). The question immediately comes to mind, however: what compels us to decide that humanity—or certain elements of it, as might have been argued by atheistic regimes—ought to be respected? What stops this from gradually transitioning into a phase where persecution of certain groups is “humanly acceptable”? What prevents the redefinition of the word “human” to exclude specific persons, without a divinely authoritative declaration such as that in Genesis as an indication that all humans are made in God’s image (Gen. 1:26)? Nothing remains, philosophically, to stop future atheists from picking and choosing their morality. Comte-Sponville’s only apparent justification for sticking with the moral capital he has borrowed from religion is that he likes the way things are working under it, but simple preference will not be sufficient to maintain an ethical system in the long term.

This is not to say that theists are not guilty of their own horrendous offenses. Christian theists, however, do so only by operating inconsistently with their professions of faith. In order to maintain ethics, ironically, Comte-Sponville similarly says that we must operate inconsistently with what we believe; so once again, the only way to maintain the atheist system is to engage in a type of hypocrisy.

Finally, Comte-Sponville errs when he says that “fear of divine retribution,” and therefore self-interest (41–42), provide the moral basis for theism. Divine retribution may function as a form of motivation, but it is love, not fear, that is to provide the moral basis for Christian belief (cf. 1 John 4:18).

We may welcome Comte-Sponville’s contribution as a much more civil defense of atheism. Comte-Sponville, however, unfortunately has followed his less-civil predecessors to the extent that he has not supplied his worldview with the substance it needs to be a reasonable alternative to theism.

—James Patrick Holding

James Patrick Holding is President of Tekton Apologetics Ministries and editor of Shattering the Christ-Myth: Did Jesus Not Exist?

One of the most satisfying aspects of apologetics ministry is hearing from people who ask permission to use ministry material to begin an apologetics teaching program in their own church. In these times when the Christian faith is increasingly under attack at all levels and discernment is scarce, sponsoring some sort of apologetics ministry at your home church can become an essential first line of defense for your friends, family, and neighbors. Sadly, not all churches have an interest in supporting apologetics ministry, and others, though willing to provide moral and prayerful support, may not be able to provide financial support for more extensive ministry projects. However, even under the most stringent circumstances, there is a great deal that can be done to assist your fellow church members in defense of their faith.

Lay the Foundation.

Initially, you may have to explain to your fellow church members—or perhaps even pastoral staff!—what apologetics is, and provide a sound biblical basis for its practice. Most apologists cite passages at 1 Peter 3:15, Jude 3, and 2 Corinthians 10:5 for evidence of the practice of apologetics in the apostolic church. It is also helpful to note that early evangelism was based on the presentation of fact, and that potential converts were called to repentance based on the historical resurrection of Jesus Christ and the evidence of both His miracles and His fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy (see, e.g., Peter’s speech in Acts 2).¹

Once a biblical basis for apologetics is established, the specific need for such ministry within your church and/or community should be demonstrated. An appeal on this basis can be made from both a positive and a negative perspective. From a negative perspective, church members and pastors can be awakened to the need for apologetics via awareness of crisis statistics indicating serious reductions in church membership and in professions of faith in Jesus Christ.

While there have been numerous analyses with varying theories concerning the cause of

these defections from practicing faith, it is clear that whatever approach to this problem a church implements would need to incorporate apologetics as part of the antidote. As the noted apologist John Warwick Montgomery has observed, “The 21st century Apologist…needs to incorporate Apologetics into every aspect of his or her ministry: every sermon, every class, every evangelistic activity. We have woefully neglected our responsibility to train our young people in the solid case for Christianity, and then we wonder why they depart from the faith under the influence of secular university instruction.”² Having excellent, solid reasons to believe the Christian faith is fundamental to maintaining a healthy worldview that is consistent with our observations and experience.

The apologist may also justify his or her ministry through the power of personal testimony.

Testimony can be offered in both a negative and a positive light. It is not difficult to find what might be called “anti-testimonies” from persons professing to have formerly been Christians, who say that they abandoned their faith because of unanswered questions that a trained apologist could easily have resolved, but which pastors or other Christians they consulted were unable to answer.³ It may also be helpful (if not indeed provocative) to present samples of atheistic or skeptical literature critical of Christianity, in order to highlight a tangible aspect of the problem.

Finally, it can be beneficial to survey your fellow church members concerning any questions

they may have had about the veracity of the Christian faith. I have found it effective, for example, to go around a room where a group is gathered, asking each member what they think the greatest challenges to their faith are, or what unresolved questions they have had about the Bible and Christianity. Few were unwilling to share their doubts and questions in a setting where others were doing the same.

Positively, the testimonies of those whose faith was strengthened by apologetics material,

and who found themselves more motivated in their evangelism because of their newfound surety of faith, can also be powerful tools. People who believe in Christianity because they have solid reasons to think that it is true will provide a far more effective witness than people who believe merely because someone else told them to, or because they had some sort of subjective experience.

Build the Walls.

Once the foundation has been established, the next step is to build a collection of resources for your church. If your church has an active library, you may be able to persuade library staff to purchase apologetics material; or perhaps you can purchase it yourself and donate it to the library. Obviously, a great deal will depend on the financial resources available. You may have to be content with providing the library with a set of bibliographies, listing books that members can read if they want more information on specific topics.

If you can add books to your church library, I would recommend giving priority to “gateway” apologetics works such as Lee Strobel’s Case series, or Hank Hanegraaff’s The Complete Bible Answer Book. More technical works by authors such as Ben Witherington or Craig Blomberg can be made as secondary purchases, or else can be listed as resources in bibliographies.

Printed materials are not your only potential resources. You may also be able to compile a roster of expert persons and organizations that church members can consult if they have questions. This may include an apologetics ministry such as the Christian Research Institute or a local seminary professor.

Have Some Class.

With resources in place, it is time to design a curriculum for an apologetics class. One of the greatest temptations is to “overload” a course with information. We should keep our audience in mind. A class composed of teachers and church leaders can be presented with more detailed information than a class composed of lay church members.

In practice, I find that it is best to craft a lesson so that the most startling or interesting aspects of an issue are highlighted, and thereafter provide a bibliography for further reading. Thus, for example, in doing a lesson on claims that the story of Jesus was based on pagan Christ-figures, I will select some of the clearest and most outrageous claims to present in the lesson proper (e.g., “1 Corinthians 10:4 was copied from Mithraic scriptures”), and this will be sufficient to alert the student to the issue and firmly implant it in his or her memory.

A bibliography attached to lesson notes will tell the students where to go for more information,

when and if they need it. Thereafter, if he or she, or a family member, encounters such claims (e.g., from the popular online movie Zeitgeist), they will know where to go for answers, without having to remember a virtual truckload of information from the lesson.

For classes for the average churchgoer, we should keep our primary focus on the defense and understanding of basic doctrines (the Atonement, the Resurrection, etc.) and major issues facing Christians in popular culture. If we teach other teachers or church leaders, a more advanced course of study is warranted, because these are the people that others look to for answers. Regrettably, it is precisely when leaders are unable to answer questions, and thereby assuage doubts, that Christians can enter into a cycle of discouragement and disillusionment in which they question their faith. This in turn can lead to a downward spiral in which the Christian loses motivation to evangelize or to serve in the Body of Christ.⁴

Stay in View.

A final, necessary step involves not only building awareness within your church fellowship, but also maintaining it. As apologists, we should make it a priority to remain on top of “hot button” issues (e.g. the alleged “tomb of Jesus,” or more recently, the Bill Maher film Religulous) and broker information about them for our churches. Ideally, we should request that pastoral staff bring attention to such issues from the pulpit on Sunday morning, and promote more in-depth programs that can be presented at other times. We might also ask for permission to provide some sort of information in our weekly church bulletins.

The critical point is that when “hot button” issues emerge, they should not simply be swept under the rug. Inevitably, inactivity in apologetics makes for ineffectiveness in evangelism. If, for example, we cannot answer questions about a film like Religulous, we foster an impression of Christians as being unwilling or unable to articulate or defend why they or anyone else should become a Christian.

As Nancy Pearcy has noted:

To be effective in equipping young people and professionals to face the challenges of a highly educated secular society, the church needs to redefine the mission of pastors and youth leaders to include training in apologetics and worldview.…Pastors must once again provide intellectual leadership for their congregations, teaching apologetics from the pulpit. Every time a minister introduces a biblical teaching, he should also instruct the congregation in ways to defend it against the major objections they are likely to encounter. A religion that avoids the intellectual task and retreats to the therapeutic realm of personal relationships and feelings will not survive in today’s spiritual battlefield.⁵

The growth of challenges to our faith, and the easy accessibility of information that challenges us, makes Pearcy’s summons a particularly urgent one. When it comes to educating Christians in the defense of their faith, it is time to be proactive instead of reactive.

—James Patrick Holding

James Patrick Holding is President of Tekton Apologetics Ministries and author of Shattering the Christ Myth (Xulon Press: 2007).

notes

1. See James Patrick Holding, “When Apologetics Was Evangelism,” Christian Research Journal 26, 1 (2003): 10–11, 51.

2. John Warwick Montgomery, “Defending the Hope That Is in Us: Apologetics for the 21st Century,” http://www.jwm.christendom.co.uk/unpublished_essay.html (accessed September 12, 2008).

3. See James Patrick Holding, “Witnessing to Those Fallen from Faith,” Christian Research Journal 28, 1 (2005): 10–11, 40.

4. On the cycle of doubt and disillusionment, see C. Michael Patton, “Leaving (Christ)ianity: An Evangelical Epidemic,” Reclaiming the Mind, http://www.reclaimingthemind.org/blog/2008/07/ leaving-christianity%E2%80%93-an-evangelical-epidemic/ (accessed September 15, 2008).

5. Nancy R. Pearcy, Total Truth: Liberating Christianity from Its Cultural Captivity (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2005), 127.